



High Unemployment after the Recession: 
Mostly Cyclical, but Adjusting Slowly
Murat Tasci
Unemployment has remained very high since the end of last recession, leading some economists to suggest that the 
underlying trend of the unemployment rate must have risen, driving unemployment permanently higher. Using a more 
accurate method of calculating the underlying trend, I ﬁ  nd that the long-term rate has not risen and that most of the re-
cent increase in the unemployment rate can be attributed to cyclical causes. But the weak nature of the recovery in real 
output and the slow rate of worker reallocation are likely to keep unemployment at relatively high levels for the near term.
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Note: The recession average is the average unemployment rate progression for 
postwar recessions, and the range is plus or minus one standard deviation.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.





















The unemployment rate rose above 9 percent during the 
recession and it has stayed there for the past 20 months—an 
unprecedented combination. The only time since the Great 
Depression that unemployment was higher was after the 
1982 recession, but that elevated level didn’t last quite as 
long—only 19 months. While there is nothing surprising 
about a high unemployment rate in the midst of a recession, 
this time around has been unusual on two counts. First, the 
margin by which unemployment increased was substantially 
greater than in other recessions, and second, 20 months is 
an exceptionally long time for the unemployment rate to 
remain so elevated. Historically, unemployment has always 
increased whenever the aggregate economy experienced 
a recession. But the rate typically peaks about 15 months 
after the beginning of the recession, or 4 months after the 
end of the recession, and then starts to drop gradually over 
time as the economy recovers (see ﬁ  gure 1). 
Many economists, policymakers, and forecasters anticipate 
that the unemployment rate will stay above 9 percent over 
the near term. Their forecasts typically assume that the 
underlying trend of the unemployment rate, sometimes 
dubbed the “natural rate of unemployment,” must have 
risen over the course of the last recession. But it is more 
likely, given the size of the drop in aggregate economic 
activity during the recession (4.15 percent, the largest in 
postwar U.S. history), that the unemployment rate’s rise 
is due mostly to cyclical factors. I argue that even if the 
unemployment-rate trend has not increased, the unemploy-
ment rate could still stay high for some time. Moreover, the 
weakness of the recovery in real output and the slow rate of 
worker reallocation are likely to keep unemployment from 
declining to pre-recession levels any time soon. A Framework for Understanding 
the Unemployment-Rate Trend
In a recent Economic Commentary, Saeed Zaman and I pro-
posed a way to measure the long-run trend of the unem-
ployment rate over time using real output and the rates at 
which workers ﬂ  ow out of employment (separation) and 
into employment (job-ﬁ  nding). Our model assumes that the 
behavior of each of these rates consists of an unobserved 
trend component that moves relatively slowly over time and 
a cyclical component that ﬂ  uctuates with the business cycle. 
We separate the trend from the cyclical component in all the 
variables, and then we use the trends of the separation and 
job-ﬁ  nding ﬂ  ows to estimate the long-term trend of the un-
employment rate. That calculation is based on the fact that, 
in the long run, the unemployment rate will converge to the 
ratio of the separation rate trend to the overall reallocation 
rate trend (the sum of the job-ﬁ  nding and separation-rate 
trends). (For a more detailed description of the model and 
results see Tasci, 2010.)
We show that when measured this way, the unemployment-
rate trend, or the natural rate, has been relatively stable 
in the last decade, even after the most recent recession 
(see ﬁ  gure 2). How the trend could have changed so little 
while unemployment has been so high is explained by the 
large size of the aggregate shock during the recession and 
two offsetting trends in the ﬂ  ows: The trend in job-ﬁ  nding 
rates, after being relatively stable for decades, declined by a 
signiﬁ  cant margin in the last decade, pushing trend unem-
ployment up. However, this effect has been partially offset 
by the trend in separation rates, which has been declining 
continuously since the 1980s. Along with the more apparent 
declining trend in separation rates, the declining trend in 
job-ﬁ  nding rates essentially implies that U.S. labor markets 
are exhibiting increasingly less worker reallocation. 
This framework based on worker ﬂ  ows can be used 
to address several important questions about what the 
expected path of unemployment might be under differ-
ent scenarios. For instance, we can estimate the effect of 
a stronger recovery in output (like we had after the 1982 
recession) or higher rates of worker reallocation (like we 
had in the 1980s) on the adjustment path of the unem-
ployment rate in the near term. 
The Impact of Lower Worker Reallocation Rates
Low rates of worker reallocation could have important 
implications for unemployment dynamics in the near term. 
In theory, the more labor market churning there is in an 
economy, the faster the unemployment rate returns to its 
trend. Intuitively, as unemployed workers start ﬁ  nding jobs 
at a higher rate, unemployment will decline faster toward its 
trend. The same is true when unemployment is lower than 
its trend level. 
To understand the impact of worker reallocation on the 
rate of the decline in the unemployment rate, we use our 
model to generate simulations of the adjustment to trend 
unemployment based on two different starting points. In 
the baseline case, we start from our current low estimates 
of job-ﬁ  nding and separation rate trends. In the alterna-
tive case, we start from the (relatively high) job-ﬁ  nding rate 
trend that was observed in the 1980s and a correspondingly 
high separation rate trend—this results in the same implied 
unemployment-rate trend as the baseline case but the labor 
reallocation rate is higher. Figure 3 shows the results of this 
experiment. The conclusion is clear; the current worker 
reallocation rate trend predicts a slower decline in the unem-
ployment rate. This difference could be as high as 
1.3 percentage points along the transition path.
Figure 2.  Flows and the Unemployment Rate
Note: The job-ﬁ  nding and separation rates are expressed as probabilities. 
Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; author’s calculations.
Figure 3.  Adjustment Delay in 
the Unemployment Rate






































reallocationThe Impact of Weaker Real Output Growth 
The previous exercise shows that the current recovery will 
be slower than it would have been had labor turnover been 
higher. However, the adjustment may be even slower than 
we calculated in that exercise, because recent GDP growth 
has been more anemic than the GDP forecasts we used in 
our simulations. Our framework assumes that the decline in 
the unemployment rate is a function of the cyclical decline 
(or increase) in real output. It implies that strong output 
growth will lead to a faster recovery in the labor market, as 
the cyclical components of the job-ﬁ  nding and separation 
rates disappear sooner, thereby lowering the cyclical compo-
nent of the observed unemployment rate. 
Figure 4 provides some evidence that the current pace of the 
recovery in real output is subpar by historical standards. We 
use our baseline model to generate growth rate predictions 
that would be consistent with a typical historical pattern, 
starting from the ﬁ  rst quarter of the recovery, 2009:Q3. 
According to these predictions, the growth rate of real GDP 
should be twice the rate it is in the data at this point in the 
recovery process, at least during the last three quarters in the 
sample. Based on our parameter estimates, average growth 
rates at this point in the cycle would have been around 
4.5 percent (annualized). 
We conduct another simulation using an alternative trajec-
tory for GDP growth to see how much of an impact it might 
have on the unemployment rate adjustment. In place of the 
GDP ﬁ  gures used in the baseline simulation, we assume 
that GDP growth behaved as it did in the recovery after 
the 1982 recession. We chose that period because the size 
of the aggregate shocks in that recession and in the recent 
recession are comparable. To do the alternative simulations, 
we back out the realization of shocks to real output from 
1982:Q3 forward and feed them into the model, generating 
unemployment rate and output realizations. Comparing the 
resulting two forecasts shows that the decline in the unem-
ployment rate could be signiﬁ  cantly lower with a weaker 
recovery, as large as 1.2 percentage points (see ﬁ  gure 5). 
As both of these experiments suggest, even if the unemploy-
ment-rate trend did not change appreciably after the last 
recession, it does not necessarily imply an optimistic path 
for the unemployment rate in the near term. The strength of 
real output growth and the effects of slower worker realloca-
tion in the U.S. labor market will be among the crucial fac-
tors determining this adjustment process. The signiﬁ  cance of 
the latter factor suggests that structural reasons behind slow 
worker reallocation might have important implications for 
unemployment dynamics over business cycles. Hence, even 
if most of the recent rise in the observed unemployment rate 
was caused by cyclical factors, structural changes in the 
labor market—causing lower worker reallocation rates—
might be preventing that cyclical unemployment from disap-
pearing sooner than it used to. 
Other Factors
In addition to the channels we explored here, there are a 
number of other factors that could potentially affect the 
adjustment process in the near term. For instance, if a signiﬁ  -
cant fraction of the unemployed workers who are currently 
receiving emergency unemployment compensation drop out 
of the labor force when these beneﬁ  ts expire, we might see a 
faster decline in the unemployment rate. On the other hand, 
if the economic recovery gains traction and motivates some 
discouraged workers to rejoin the labor force and search 
for a job again, the unemployment rate might decline even 
more slowly. 
Figure 4.  GDP Growth Rates Figure 5.  Unemployment Rates
Note: Dates indicated represent the third quarter of each year. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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